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Abstract. Choice-based conjoint (CBC) studies have begun to rely on simulators to forecast
equilibrium prices for pricing, strategic product positioning, and patent/copyright val-
uations. Whereas CBC research has long focused on the accuracy of estimated relative
partworths of attribute levels, predicted equilibrium prices and strategic positioning
are surprisingly and dramatically dependent on scale: the magnitude of the partworths
(including the price coefﬁcient) relative to the magnitude of the error term. Although
the impact of scale on the ability to estimate heterogeneous partworths is well known,
neither the literature nor current practice address the sensitivity of pricing and posi-
tioning to scale. This sensitivity is important because (estimated) scale depends on seemingly
innocuous market-research decisions such as whether attributes are described by text or by
realistic images. We demonstrate the strategic implications of scale using a stylized model in
which heterogeneity is modeled explicitly. If a ﬁrm shirks on the quality of a CBC study and
acts on incorrectly observed scale, a follower, but not an innovator, can make costly
strategic errors. Externally valid estimates of scale are extremely important. We dem-
onstrate empirically that image realism and incentive alignment affect scale sufﬁciently
to change strategic decisions and affect patent/copyright valuations by hundreds of
millions of dollars.
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1. Scale Affects Strategic Decisions
With an estimated 18,000 applications per year, conjoint
analysis is one of the most-used quantitative market
research methods (Orme 2014, Sawtooth Software
2015). Over 80% of these conjoint applications are
choice based (Sawtooth Software 2016). Firms rou-
tinely use choice-based conjoint (CBC) analysis to
identify preferred product attributes in the hopes of
maximizing proﬁt—for example, General Motors alone
spends tens of millions of dollars each year (Urban
and Hauser 2004). CBC analysis is increasingly used
in litigation, and courts have awarded billion-dollar
judgments for patent or copyright infringement based
on CBC studies (Mintz 2012, Cameron et al. 2013,
McFadden 2014).
Research in CBC analysis has long focused on
the ability to estimate accurate relative trade-offs
among product attribute levels. Improved question
selection, improved estimation, and techniques such
as incentive alignment all enhance accuracy of iden-
tiﬁed relative trade-offs and lead to better managerial
decisions. However, with the advancement of CBC
simulators and faster computers, researchers have
begun to use CBC studies to estimate price equilibria
and the resulting equilibrium proﬁts (e.g., Allenby
et al. 2014). This use of CBC analysis raises a new
concern because, as shown in this paper, the calculated
price equilibria depend critically on “scale,” where
scale is the magnitude of the partworths (including
the price partworths) relative to the magnitude of the
error.1 Whereas the literature has long focused on
the impact of scale heterogeneity in CBC estimation,
our focus is on a common scale factor in CBC studies.
For example, we demonstrate that scale can be quite
different if we use realistic images rather than text-
only stimuli or if we use incentive alignment rather
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than no incentive alignment. (The goal of realism is
to represent better choices made by consumers in the
marketplace.)
Our research combines formal modeling to un-
derstand the phenomena and empirical CBC studies
that vary on the realism of the stimuli and on incentive
alignment. The empirical studies include a delayed vali-
dation task that mimics consumers’ marketplace de-
cisions as a proxy to estimate “true” scale. Together, the
theory and practice provide complementary insights:
Theory
• Scale affects strategic decisions, such as how to
position and set price, even when we account for
unobserved attributes and preference heterogeneity
(a stylized version of commonhierarchical Bayes [HB],
latent structure, or machine-learning estimation).
• Equilibria prices are extremely sensitive to true
scale; that is, the scale that best describes marketplace
decisions.
• For high relative values of true scale, the proﬁt-
maximizing strategy is to differentiate. For low relative
values of true scale, the proﬁt-maximizing strategy is
not to differentiate.
• If a follower shirks onmarket research and gets a
biased estimate of scale, the follower could make the
wrong strategic decisions (price and positioning) and
forego substantial proﬁts.
• The innovator’s strategic decisions do not depend
on estimated scale.
Practice
• When the stylized assumptions are relaxed in
empirical studies, the identiﬁed phenomena and stra-
tegic recommendations remain valid.
• Seemingly innocuous aspects of a CBC study can
have huge effects on predicted equilibrium prices. We
test incentive alignment and image realism.
• Aspects of a CBC study can affect strategic po-
sitioning, that is, which attribute level maximizes
equilibrium proﬁts.
• If estimated scale is adjusted based on a mar-
ketplace validation task, then both pricing and po-
sitioning decisions are affected. A ﬁrm may position
differently and choose a different price depending
on whether the ﬁrm acts on unadjusted scale or
validation-adjusted scale.
• Data-based hypotheses for further research are
as follows: (1) Image realism is very important.
(2) Image realism may be more important than incen-
tive alignment. (3) Validation-adjusted scale implies
predicted price equilibria that differ dramatically
from price equilibria based on scale estimated from
the CBC proﬁle choices.
The practical implications are important. Although
a few CBC studies (academic literature and practice)
use highly realistic images and incentive alignment,
most do not. Although a very few CBC studies adjust
estimates with validation tasks, the vast majority do
not. Because our theory and data suggest that such
“craft” matters substantially, we also recommend
practical decision processes by which ﬁrms can de-
cide whether to invest in these elements of CBC craft.
We expect that CBC craft can impact managerial
decisions—this is intuitive. But neither the magni-
tude and direction of the strategic errors nor the large
effect of seemingly minor differences in CBC craft
are obvious without the insights from the stylized
model. (At minimum, many aspects of craft are un-
derappreciated in the academic literature and the vast
majority of CBC applications.)
2. Typical Practice in CBC Studies and
Recent Changes in Practice
2.1. Typical Current Practice
In CBC analysis, products (or services) are summa-
rized by a set of levels of the attributes. For example, a
smartwatchmight have awatch face (attribute) that is
either round or rectangular (levels), be silver or gold
colored, and have a black or brown leather band. By
varying the smartwatch attribute levels systemati-
cally within an experimental design, CBC analysis
estimates preferences for attribute levels (and price),
called “partworths,” which describe the differential
value of the attribute levels. For example, one part-
worth might represent the differential value of a rect-
angular watch face relative to a round watch face.
Applied practice focuses on estimating accurately
the relative partworths. For example, if rectangular
and round watch faces are equally costly but the
partworth of a rectangular watch face is greater than
the partworth of a round watch face for most con-
sumers, then a typical recommendation would be
to launch a product with a rectangular watch face.
The relative partworths can also be used to calculate
willingness to pay (WTP) by comparing differences
in partworths to the estimated price coefﬁcient. For
example, if a consumer’s differential value between a
rectangular and a round watch face is higher than
the consumer’s valuation of a $100 reduction in the
purchase price,ﬁrms typically infer that the consumer
is willing to pay more than $100 for a rectangular
rather than a round watch face. (There are subtleties
in this calculation because of the Bayesian nature of
most estimates, but this is the basic concept.)
These calculations depend only on the (posterior
distribution of) relative partworths. Because attribute-
level partworths and the price coefﬁcient are deﬁned
relative to one another, if we multiply all partworths and
the price coefﬁcient by a constant, the comparative value
andWTPcalculations remainunchanged.However, the
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literature has established that estimated partworths
also depend on scale heterogeneity. In particular, if
scale varies among consumers, then the accuracy with
which the relative partworths can be estimated depends
on accounting for heterogeneity in scale during esti-
mation (e.g., Beck et al. 1993, Swait and Louviere 1993,
Fiebig et al. 2010, Salisbury and Feinberg 2010,
Pancreas et al. 2016). Scale heterogeneity affects part-
worth estimation and/or aggregation of respondents’
WTP, but, once researchers account for heterogene-
ity, WTP does not depend on a common (across re-
spondents) increase or decrease in scale (e.g., Ofek and
Srinivasan 2002, equation 15). The phenomenon we
investigate is different from scale heterogeneity; we
focus on the strategic implications of a common scale
factor in a stylized model assuming accurate relative
partworths and assuming the estimation accounts for
scale heterogeneity. (The assumptions of accurate rela-
tive partworths is relaxed in the empirical analyses.)
The literature recognizes that estimated partworths
may need to be adjusted to better represent market-
place choices. One approach is to adjust scale and
relative partworths to match market shares and use the
adjusted scale and partworths in simulations (e.g.,
Gilbride et al. 2008). The adjustments are motivated
by predictive ability rather than strategic implica-
tions. A second approach adjusts scale directly or in a
procedure known as randomized ﬁrst choice (RFC),
in which an additive error is included in the simu-
lations (Huber et al. 1999). RFC automatically de-
termines the random perturbations to yield “ap-
proximately the same scale factor as the [logit]model”
(Sawtooth Software 2019). Scale adjustments are easy
to implement, but usage is rare—users almost always
stick with the scale observed in the CBC estimation
(Orme 2017). Many users report that marketplace
data, as a benchmark to adjust scale and relative
partworths, are often not available, for example, for
innovations, or not relevant to the simulated markets.
Our stylized model and empirical illustrations suggest
that validation adjustments are critical and should be
used more often. We also provide an alternative ad-
justment that does not require marketplace data.
2.2. Current Practice is Changing: The Implications
of Price Equilibria
WTP provides valuable diagnostic information for
pricing and attribute-level decisions and has been
used to motivate and interpret valuations in patent/
copyright cases (e.g., Mintz 2012, Cameron et al. 2013,
McFadden 2014), but WTP does not account for
competitive response. WTP does not indicate how
marketplace prices will respond to new products or
changes in a product’s attributes (Orme 2014, pp. 90–91;
Orme and Chrzan 2017, p. 194). Because of the in-
ﬂuence of game theory in marketing science, CBC
simulators are beginning to consider competitive re-
sponse. For example, if an innovator introduces a
silver-colored watch face and a follower responds
with a gold-colored watch face (and all other attri-
butes are held constant), then CBC simulations can be
used to calculate the Nash price equilibrium. Allenby
et al. (2014) propose that these methods be used to
value patents and copyrights. Courts recognized
the issue as early as 2005 for class-action cases (e.g.,
Whyte 2005; albeit not CBC) and since at least 2012 in
patent cases (Koh 2012). Although not proposed pre-
viously, simulators can use equilibrium prices to calcu-
latethefollower’smost-proﬁtable strategic-positioning
response (silver versus gold) to the innovator’s new
product (silver or gold).
We show that scale (and validation-based scale
adjustment) plays a central role when predicting price
equilibria and predicting optimal competitive reac-
tions. We illustrate the magnitude of the managerial
implications. (Sawtooth Software estimates that 80%
of managerial CBC applications consider competi-
tion in market simulations, although the explicit
calculation of equilibrium prices is relatively new
(Orme 2017).)
3. Empirical Illustration to Motivate the
Phenomena We Seek to Study
Before we derive the stylized model and before we de-
scribe fully the empirical tests, it is useful to illustrate the
phenomena we seek to study.
3.1. Scale Affects the Price Equilibria That
Are Calculated
As an illustration, we plot the predicted equilibrium
price of an innovator as a function of the true scale
(γtrue). Figure 1 illustrates how the predicted price
equilibrium might change if estimated scale depends
on the craft of a CBC study. We use the distribution of
relative partworths obtained in our empirical study
Figure 1. Predicted Equilibrium Price Depends on Scale
Notes. Data are from our empirical study of smartwatches. Error bars
are posterior standard deviations.
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about smartwatches (HB CBC details in Section 8.5)
and calculate the (counterfactual) price equilibria for
each level of scale (methods described in Section 8.8).
The equilibria are based on a market with two ﬁrms
whose products differ on the watch color (silver
versus gold). We chose the range of the scales to be
typical of those reported in the literature and in our
empirical studies. (Over the range in Figure 1, equi-
librium prices are monotonically deceasing in scale,
but there is no guarantee that they do not increase
slightly as γtrue→∞. Indeed, they do so in the illustra-
tive example in Online Appendix 1.) We obtain similar
results for watch face (round versus rectangular) and
watch band (combinations of three levels).
The intuition of Figure 1, shown formally in the
stylized model, is that simulated choice probabilities
are more sensitive to price changes (or changes in
attribute levels) when scale increases even though the
relative partworths remain unchanged. Greater sen-
sitivity implies more price competition, which drives
down equilibrium prices.
This wide difference in (predicted) equilibrium prices
hasmanagerial and litigation implications. For example,
suppose that a ﬁrm’s CBC study reports scale  0.4 but
the marketplace acts according to scale  1.0; then the
ﬁrm would likely earn substantially less proﬁt than it
expects. The effect is real. In Section 8.7, data suggest
that differences in craft yield estimates of (relative)
scale that vary from 0.35 to 1.00.
Using estimates of over 11.9 million Apple Watch
sales in 2016 (Reisinger 2017), the calculated price
equilibrium swing of $158 implies a swing of more
than $1.8 billion in revenue. If the predicted multiyear
proﬁt were only a small fraction of the revenue swing,
it would still be substantial. Proﬁts are based on prices,
quantities, and costs, which we address later. In litiga-
tion, units sold and costs are often held constant in the
“but-for” world; CBC craft would swing damages
estimates by $1.8 billion.
3.2. Scale Affects Strategic Positioning Decisions
We use the same smartwatch empirical data, but re-
port predicted proﬁts for (counterfactual) values of
scale. In this illustration, proﬁts are price times share.
We consider a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms
choose their positioning (silver versus gold). In the
second stage, ﬁrms launch their products, the mar-
ketplace reacts, and the ﬁrms obtain equilibrium
proﬁts based on equilibrium prices. Table 1 presents
the equilibrium proﬁts for all possible positioning
decisions by an innovator and a follower. (The in-
novator’s proﬁt is the top number in each subcell of
Table 1; the follower’s proﬁt is the bottom number.)
If scale is higher, in equilibrium, the innovator and
follower choose to differentiate their products (the
innovator chooses silver, the follower chooses gold),
whereas if scale is lower, the innovator and follower
choose to offer the same product (both choose silver).
At least for the follower, the recommended attribute
level depends on the “true” scale, holding relative
partworths constant.
Typical CBC studies make recommendations based
on the partworths and scale as estimated based on the
CBC design (choice sets). But consumers may choose
differently in the marketplace. In Section 8, we use a
validation task that mimics the marketplace to adjust
scale. We illustrate that strategic recommendations
change depending on whether scale is adjusted based
on the validation task. Unadjusted scale recommends
differentiation; validation-adjusted scale recommends
no differentiation for the data in this paper. This is a new
reason to consider including realistic validation tasks
that go beyond holdout validation in a CBC study.
4. General Formulation andBasic Notation
We begin with notation for a fully heterogeneous model
because the empirical studies in Section 8 use a fully
heterogeneous model. (Different consumers can have
different relative partworths and scale.) Appendix A
summarizes notation for both the heterogeneous
model and a more stylized formal model. Although
empirical studies, including ours, can have many at-
tributes and many levels for each attribute, we focus
in the stylized model on a single attribute with two
levels. This focus in the stylized model is sufﬁcient to
illustrate the impact of scale and is consistent with
Irmen and Thisse (1998, p. 78), who conclude that
“differentiation in a single dimension is sufﬁcient to
relax price competition and to permit ﬁrms to enjoy the
advantages of a central location in all other characteris-
tics.”Our stylized model also applies to simultaneous
differentiation of a composite of multiple dimensions,
say, a silver smartwatch with a rectangular face and
a black leather band versus a gold smartwatch with a
Table 1. Relative Proﬁts as a Function of Strategic
Positioning
Follower’s position
Innovator’s position Silver Gold
Higher scale (0.8)
Silver 72.7 110.8
72.7 81.2
Gold 81.2 62.8
110.8 62.8
Lower scale (0.4)
Silver 112.6 132.9
112.6 106.6
Gold 106.6 100.2
132.9 100.2
Notes. RelativeHBCBCpartworths are heterogeneous, but the same in
higher- and lower-scale markets. Innovator’s proﬁt is the top number
in a subcell; follower’s proﬁt the bottom number. Bold indicates an
equilibrium.
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round watch face and a metal band. Both stylistically
and empirically, we hold all attributes other than our
focal attributes constant across products. In the stylized
model, there are no unobserved attributes.
4.1. Formal Deﬁnitions
To match typical applications of CBC, we focus on
discrete (horizontal) levels of an attribute that we label
r and s. A product can have either ror s, but not both. If
mnemonics help, think of r as round, regular, routine,
ruby, or rust colored, and s as square, small, special,
sapphire, or scarlet. Although the empirical model can
handle many ﬁrms, it is sufﬁcient for the stylized model
to focus on twoﬁrms, each ofwhich sells one product.We
allow an “outside option” to capture other ﬁrms and
products that are exogenous to the strategic decisions
of the two-ﬁrm duopoly. In Section 9.4, we show that
the insights apply when there are more than two prod-
ucts, more than one attribute, and more than two levels.
Let uij be consumer i’s utility for ﬁrm j’s product, let
uio be i’s utility for the outside option, and let pj be
product j’s price. Let βri and βsi be i’s partworths for
attribute levels r and s, respectively, and let δrj and δsj
be indicator functions for whether ﬁrm j’s product
has r or s, respectively. Let ηi indicate i’s preference
for price, let ij be an extreme value error term with
variance π2/6γ2i . If the error terms are independent
and identically distributed, we have the standard
logit model for the probability, Pij, that consumer i
purchases ﬁrm j’s product (relative to ﬁrm k’s product
and the outside option):
uij  βriδrj + βsiδsj − ηipj + ij,
Pij  e
γi(βriδrj+βsiδsj−ηipj)
eγi(βriδrj+βsiδsj−ηipj) + eγi(βriδr,k≠ j+βsiδs,k≠ j−ηipk≠ j) + eγiuio .
(1)
Utility (uij) is unique to at most a positive linear
transformation (Train 2009, p. 27); hence, the mag-
nitude of the error term (ij), the inverse of the error
standard deviation (γi), and the price and partworth
coefﬁcients (ηi, βri, βsi) are deﬁned to at most a mul-
tiplicative constant. For a single CBC study, we cannot
simultaneously estimate βri, βsi, ηi, and γi, nor can we
independently interpret the magnitude of any of these
constructs. Within a CBC study, the magnitudes of
these constructs can be interpreted (and estimated) only
relative to one another. (We can, and do, show how
estimates can vary between different domains such as
between higher-cost and lower-cost CBC studies.)
4.2. Relationships Among Different Normalizations
Because βri, βsi, ηi, and γi are relative constructs, we
must impose one constraint for identiﬁcation for both
interpretation and estimation. The constraint varies
in the literature. McFadden (2014) constrains the price
coefﬁcient, ηi, to unity. In the McFadden (2014) nor-
malization, scale is deﬁned as ηiγi. Because ηi ≡ 1,
scale becomes ηiγi  γi. The McFadden (2014) nor-
malization has the intuitive advantage that the attribute-
level relative partworth differences are measured in
currency units and can be interpreted as WTPs. From
our perspective, the McFadden (2014) normalization
enables the stylized model to manipulate scale in-
dependently from the relative partworths.
Sonnier et al. (2007) normalize theCBCmodel using
µi  1/γi. When ηi  1, we deﬁne scale as ηi/µi 
1/µi ≡ γi. The Sonnier et al. (2007) normalization has
no effect for maximum-likelihood estimation, but
we must adjust the prior distributions for µi when
computing Bayesian posterior distributions. For the
stylized model, we use the McFadden (2014) normal-
ization because it is more intuitive when greater scale
implies that the “signal-to-noise” ratio is larger.
The Allenby et al. (2014) normalization, used com-
monly in practice, sets γi  µi  1. In this normali-
zation, WTPs require division by ηi and scale is
proportional to the magnitude of the partworths. For-
mally, in the Allenby et al. (2014) normalization, scale
becomes ηiγi ≡ ηi/µi  ηi. Although the Allenby et al.
(2014) normalizationmakes it more difﬁcult to untangle
relative partworths and scale, the basic theoretical and
practical insights do not change. For the stylized
model, all three normalizations are strategically equiv-
alent (Keeney and Raiffa 1976). Empirically, HB, but
not maximum likelihood, estimation is slightly dif-
ferent with the Allenby et al. (2014) normalization
versus the McFadden (2014) and the Sonnier et al.
(2007) normalizations. Section 9.1 summarizes the em-
pirical implications of the three normalizations.
In our stylized model, we focus on the effect of a
common scale factor that may be affected by CBC
craft. To isolate the effect of scale in the stylized
model, we assume relative partworths are not af-
fected by craft. (The impacts on relative partworths
are well studied, not new to this paper, and are added
back to the empirical model.)
When CBC craft affects both scale and relative part-
worths (Section 9.3), researchers may prefer a dif-
ferent empirical deﬁnition of scale. For example, with
the Allenby et al. (2014) normalization, researchers
have deﬁned scale as the sum of the estimated im-
portances. (The importance of an attribute is deﬁned as
the difference between the largest and smallest part-
worth of an attribute.) This alternative definition does
not affect the stylized model, because, in the styl-
ized model, relative partworths do not depend on craft.
Empirically, when scale is isolated such that relative
partworths are mostly unaffected by craft, the compar-
isons among experimental conditions do not depend on
the normalization-dependent deﬁnition of scale.
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4.3. Proﬁt Equations
If V is the market volume (including volume due to
the outside option), cj is the marginal cost for product
j, Cj is ﬁrm j’s ﬁxed cost, and f (βri, βsi, γi) is the prob-
ability distribution over the relative partworths and
scale (posterior if Bayesian), then the proﬁt, πj, for
ﬁrm j is given by
πj  V (pj − cj)
∫
​
Pij f (βri, βsi, γi)dβridβsidγi − Cj. (2)
(Empirically, if all estimates are Bayesian, we use the
posterior distribution in the standard way.)
For the purposes of this paper, we assume that cj
does not depend on the quantity sold nor the choice of
r or s. These assumptions can be relaxed and do not
reverse the basic intuition in this paper. (The effect of
the relative cost of r or s is well studied; see, e.g.,
Moorthy 1988.)
4.4. Interpretation and Implications of the
Error Term
The error term in CBC analysis has many interpre-
tations and implications. It has been interpreted as
inherent stochasticity in consumer choice behavior and/
or sources that are unobservable to the researcher, such
as unobserved heterogeneity, unobserved attributes,
functional misspeciﬁcations, or consumer stochasticity
that is introduced by the CBC experiment (e.g., because
of fatigue; see, e.g., Thurstone 1927, Manski 1977). We
are most interested in what happens to the (observed)
scale when the craft of the CBC study changes, say,
by the addition of incentive alignment or images that
better approximate the marketplace (more realistic
images). To address this issue, we assume that the
ﬁrm acts strategically on a CBC study anticipating the
price equilibria implied by the CBC study. However,
after the ﬁrm selects its positioning strategy (say
a silver versus gold smartwatch) and launches its
product, the prices are set by market forces; that is, the
marketplace reaches the equilibrium prices because
ﬁrms adjust price after launch until they reach a Nash
price equilibrium.
If the ﬁrm acts on a CBC study it believes to be
correct, the ﬁrm will anticipate a price equilibrium
based on the scale it believes to be true andwill choose
its position optimally based on its beliefs. But the
actual realized equilibrium prices may differ if the
ﬁrm’s beliefs about scale are not sufﬁciently accurate.
The mechanism by which marketplace prices adjust
after positioning decisions is based on market re-
action. The mechanism is different from the more com-
mon simplifying assumption in modern game theory
that “ﬁrms compete non-cooperatively in product
speciﬁcations with instantaneous adjustment to the
Nash equilibrium prices” (Economides 1986, p. 67).
The difference is necessary because, unlike typical
models, the ﬁrm may act based on market research it
only believes to be accurate. Ourmechanism is similar
to that expressed by Hotelling (1929, pp. 48–49):
But understandings between competitors are notori-
ously fragile. Let one of these business men, say B, ﬁnd
himself suddenly in need of cash. Immediately at hand
he will have a resource: Let him lower his price a little,
increasing his sales. His proﬁts will be larger until
A decides to stop sacriﬁcing business and lowers his
price to the point of maximum proﬁt. B will now be
likely to go further in an attempt to recoup, and so the
system will descend to the equilibrium position. Here
neither competitor will have any incentive to lower his
price further, since the increased business obtainable
would fail to compensate him.
Because actual sales and equilibrium prices depend
on how consumers react to the products’ chosen
positions after the products are introduced to the
market, we need the concept of a true scale (γtrue) that
represents how the marketplace reacts. We pur-
posefully do not deﬁne true scale as a philosophical
construct—it is deﬁned as the scale that best repre-
sents how consumers actually react in the market-
place. Practically, we expect the true scale to be ﬁnite
because of inherent stochasticity (e.g., Bass 1974),
but our stylized theory allows true scale to approach
inﬁnity. Our model admits many explanations of in-
herent uncertainty. The stylized model needs to assume
only that, even with the best possible craft, the ﬁrm’s
prediction of consumer behavior includes a (possibly
zero) error term. True scale is a latent construct; the
ﬁrm can at best estimate its value.
4.5. Relationship to Prior Research
Our perspective draws on, but is quite different from
the pioneering work by Anderson et al. (1999), de
Palma et al. (1985, 1987), and Rhee et al. (1992), who
also explore the strategic implications of a normali-
zation constant in a logit model. They represent the
marketplace, not individual consumers, by a logit
model and interpret the normalization constant
(µ  1/γ) as heterogeneity in consumer utility as in
the paper by de Palma et al. (1985, p. 779), who state,
“theworld is pervasively heterogeneous, andwehave
made it clear how, in a particular model, this restores
smoothness [that leads to differentiation].” In their
analyses, the ﬁrms act strategically on their un-
certainty about this heterogeneity. As heterogeneity
increases ﬁrms on a Hotelling line seek minimum
differentiation.
Our stylized model makes different assumptions
and has different foci:
• We explicitly constructed the stylized model to
model heterogeneity and, hence, rule out unobserved
Hauser, Eggers, and Selove: Scale in Choice-Based Conjoint Analysis
1064 Marketing Science, 2019, vol. 38, no. 6, pp. 1059–1081, © 2019 The Author(s)
heterogeneity as an explanation for scale and craft
effects.
• We explicitly constructed the stylized model so
that there are no unobserved attributes and, hence,
rule out unobserved attributes as an explanation for
scale and craft effects. (Online Appendix 13 reviews
minimum versus maximum differentiation theories
that rely on unobserved attributes.)
• We focus on how craft (and external validation)
in CBC studies affects scale and, through scale, dif-
ferentiation.We do not focus on differentiation per se.
• We allow ﬁrms to act on different types of in-
formation (CBC studies) about consumers; our theory
seeks to provide practical suggestions forwidely used
market research methods.
• We illustrate the effects of craft on scale and
provide examples of the effect sizes, using data from
professional-quality CBC studies.
• Empirically, we model heterogeneity explicitly
and attempt to rule out unobserved attributes.
5. Stylized Formal Model with
Two-Segment Heterogeneity
In the stylized model, we focus on two mutually
exclusive and collectively exhaustive consumer seg-
ments with different relative partworths. This level of
heterogeneity is sufﬁcient to enable two ﬁrms to target
different segments and sufﬁcient to illustrate the stra-
tegic effects of scale. The strategic effects survive the
more general empirical applications in Section 8, which
use standard estimation procedures (HB CBC, tested
with three related normalizations).
We label the segments R and S, with segment sizes
R and S, respectively. Partworths vary between seg-
ments, but are homogeneous within segment (βri  βrR
and βsi  βsR for all i in segment R; βri  βrS and βsi 
βsS for all i in segment S). Scale varies among consumers
in the empirical applications, but in the stylized model
we focus on a common scale adjustment that might
vary among CBC studies of different quality. For this
purpose, it is sufﬁcient to assume scale is constant across
consumers such that γi  γ for all i.
We investigate trade-offs that ﬁrms make between
(1) a differentiated strategy in which each ﬁrm targets
different attribute levels and (2) an undifferentiated
strategy in which both ﬁrms target the same attribute
levels. To do so, we need one attribute level to bemore
attractive than the other. Given the other symmetries
in the model, it is sufﬁcient to model the relative
inﬂuence of an attribute level by the percent of con-
sumerswhoprefer that attribute level,Ror S.We need
partworths to vary between segments. It is sufﬁ-
cient that their relative values reverse (r_s in one
segment and s_r in the other segment). Although the
partworths differ between segments, it would be re-
dundant to also vary the magnitude of partworth
differences; thus, we set βrR  βsS  βh and βsR  βrS 
βℓ. We set βh ≥ βℓ and R≥ Swithout loss of generality.
Setting R≥S assures that the ﬁrm prefers r≽ s, ceteris
paribus. (We can also set βℓ = 0 without loss of gen-
erality, but interpretations are more intuitive if we
retain βℓ in the notation.)
The costs, cj and Cj, affect strategic decisions in the
obvious ways and need not be addressed in this
paper. For example, a ﬁrm might require a minimum
price such that pj ≥ cj or choose not to enter if Cj is too
large. Such effects are well studied and affect ﬁrm
decisions above and beyond the strategic effect of
scale. For focus, we normalize V to a unit market
volume, set Cj  0, and roll marginal costs into price
by setting cj  0.
We label the potential strategic positions for ﬁrms 1
and 2, respectively, as either rr, rs, sr, or ss. For example,
rsmeans that ﬁrm 1 positions at r and ﬁrm 2 positions
at s. Because prices,market shares, and proﬁts depend
on these strategic positioning decisions, we subscript
prices, shares, and proﬁts accordingly. For example,
p1rr is ﬁrm 1’s price in a market in which ﬁrm 1’s
position is r and ﬁrm 2’s position is r.
6. The Effect of Scale on Equilibrium Prices
and Strategic Positioning Decisions
6.1. Basic Game to Demonstrate the Impact of True
Scale (Inherent Stochasticity)
The price-positioning game is consistent with key
references in the strategic positioning literature (see
Online Appendix 13) and realistic for most markets.
Temporarily, we assume the ﬁrms believe they know
γtrue, which may be either ﬁnite or approach inﬁnity.
(Inﬁnite γtrue is equivalent to a ﬁrst-choice rule in CBC
simulators.) Based on this knowledge, the ﬁrms ﬁrst
choose their product positions (r or s) sequentially,
and then the marketplace sets prices. (If the ﬁrms
are correct in their beliefs, they correctly anticipate
equilibriumprices.)Thepositioningdecisions,oncemade,
are not easily reversible, perhaps because of produc-
tion capabilities or ephemeral advertising investments.
Without loss of generality, ﬁrm 1 is the innovator, and
ﬁrm 2 is the follower. The innovator enters assuming
that the follower will choose its positions optimally.
(We abstracted away from entry decisions by setting
cj  Cj  0.) After the ﬁrms have entered, Nash equilib-
rium prices, if they exist, are realized. This two-stage
gamewill be embedded in another game in Section 7 in
which ﬁrms know that the CBC study may be im-
perfect and choose whether to invest in higher-cost
craft to better estimate scale prior to making strategic
positioning decisions. We address the relationship to
simultaneous entry in Online Appendix 14. We use
asterisks to indicate Nash equilibrium prices, shares,
and proﬁts.
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The equilibria we obtain, and strategies that are
best for the innovator and follower, have the ﬂavor
of models in the asymmetric competition literature
(minimum versus maximum differentiation), but
with two important differences: (1) Our results are not
driven by unobserved heterogeneity or strategically
relevant unobserved attributes. (2) Our results are
focused on providing a structure to understand and
evaluate the impact of improvements in CBC craft. We
develop the formal structure as a practical tool to eval-
uate whether improvements, such as more realistic im-
ages or incentive alignment, affect strategic decisions.
6.2. Price Equilibria in Heterogeneous Logit Models
(as in CBC Analysis)
We are not the ﬁrst to investigate price equilibria in
logit models. Choi et al. (1990) demonstrate that price
equilibria exist if partworths are homogeneous and con-
sumers are not overly price sensitive. Their condition
(Choi et al. 1990, p. 179) suggests that price equilibria
are more likely to exist if there is greater uncertainty
in consumer preferences—a result consistentwith our
model which, in addition, accounts for heterogeneity.
Choi andDeSarbo (1994) use similar concepts to solve
a positioning problem with exhaustive enumeration.
Luo et al. (2007) extend the analysis to include het-
erogeneous partworths and equilibria at the retail
level. They use numeric methods to ﬁnd Stackelberg
equilibria if and when the equilibria exist.
We cannot simply assume that price equilibria exist
and are unique. For example, Aksoy-Pierson et al.
(2013) (hereafter, APAF) warn that price equilibria
in heterogeneous logit models may not exist. APAF
generalize the analyses of Caplin and Nalebuff (1991)
to establish sufﬁcient conditions for price equilibria
to exist, to be unique, and to be given by theﬁrst-order
conditions. The APAF conditions apply to typical HB
CBC studies (Aksoy-Pierson et al. 2013, section 6);
thus, we check existence and uniqueness in both our
stylized model and in our empirical analyses.
6.3. Equilibria in the Price Subgame
Using Equation (1), we obtain implicit ﬁrst-order
and second-order conditions for optimal prices and
proﬁts. We use these conditions to derive implicit
equations for the equilibrium prices and proﬁts.
Differentiating further, we obtain implicit second-
order and cross-partial conditions (see Appendix B).
We establish that interior equilibria exist and are
unique given (mild) sufﬁcient conditions. Equilibria
exist and are unique for most posterior draws in the
empirical analysis when prices are constrained to be
within the range of measurement. When they exist,
the empirical equilibria are unique. The equilibria
exist and are unique in an illustrative example of the
stylized model (Section 7.6).
6.4. True Scale Affects the Relative Proﬁts of the
Firms’ Positioning Strategies
We temporarily assume the ﬁrm believes it knows the
true scale, which can be either ﬁnite (inherent un-
certainty in consumer choices) or approach inﬁnity
(no inherent uncertainty). In Section 7, we use the
results of this section to explore what happens when
the ﬁrm does not know the true scale and bases its
decisions on CBC market research. All proofs are
formalized in Appendix B.
To understand the effect of true scale on ﬁrms’
positioning strategies (choice of attribute levels in
equilibrium), we examine how proﬁt-maximizing
attribute levels change as true scale increases from
small to large. Because the functions are continuous,
we need only show the extremes. Appendix B es-
tablishes that, for sufﬁciently low true scale, price
moderation through differentiation does not offset
the advantage of targeting the larger segment and
both innovator and follower choose the most proﬁt-
able attribute level, r. The proof is driven by the fact
that the logit curve becomes ﬂatter as γtrue→ 0. In
this regime, the effect of attribute changes or price
changes has less effect on choice probabilities.
When price is endogenous, common intuition is not
correct. All shares, including the outside option, do
not tend toward equality as γtrue→ 0. The endogenous
increase in equilibrium prices offsets this effect. In-
stead, while the innovator and follower shares move
closer to one another, the equilibrium prices increase
and reduce shares relative to the outside option.
As γtrue gets large, both the innovator and the fol-
lower prefer differentiation. Formally, we use two
mild sufﬁcient, but not necessary, conditions: (1) the
relative partworth of r is larger than the relative
partworth of the outside option and (2) the relative
partworth of the outside option is at least as large as
the relative partworth of s. We also prove that, among
the undifferentiated strategies, both the innovator and
follower prefer to target the larger segment and, under
the sufﬁcient conditions and large γtrue, the innovator
prefers the larger segment. These intermediate re-
sults produce an equilibrium in product positions.
(See Appendix B for proofs.)
6.5. Equilibrium in Product Positions
Proposition 1. For low true scale (γtrue→ 0), the innovator
(ﬁrm 1) targets the larger segment (r), and the follower
chooses not to differentiate. The follower targets the larger
segment (r).
Proposition 2. If βh is sufﬁciently larger than uo and if
uo ≥ βℓ, then there exists a sufﬁciently large γtrue such that
the innovator targets the larger segment (r), and the follower
chooses to differentiate by targeting the smaller segment (s).
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Because the proﬁt functions are continuous (see
also APAF), Propositions 1 and 2 and the mean value
theorem imply that there exists a γcutoff such that the
follower is indifferent between rr and rs. We calculate
γcutoff as {γ : π*2rs(γ)  π*2rr(γ)}. Numerically, for awide
variety of parameter values, the proﬁt functions are
smooth, the cutoff value is unique, and π*2rs − π*2rr is
monotonically increasing in γtrue. We have not found
a counterexample.
7. Implications for Investing in the Quality
of CBC Studies
7.1. Aspects of Craft in CBC Studies
We reviewed the conjoint analysis papers in Mar-
keting Science from the last 16 years (2003–2018).
Forty-six papers addressed new estimation methods,
newadaptivequestioningmethods,methods tomotivate
respondents, more efﬁcient designs, noncompensatory
methods, and other improvements. Mostly, papers fo-
cused on the improved estimation of relative partworths
or implied managerial interpretations. Six of the papers
address the implications of scale (or a related concept
for non-CBC papers) explicitly, and of those six, three
focus on more accurate estimation, one on weighting
consumers, one on brand credibility, and one on peer
inﬂuence. None discuss the strategic (price or position-
ing) implications of scale (see Online Appendix 15).
There is substantially less focus in the conjoint-
analysis literature on data-quality issues such as
selecting stimuli to best represent marketplace choices
(realistic stimuli). Most papers do not report whether
stimuli are text only, pictorial, or animated, but of those
that do, the vast majority are text only. Although in-
terest in incentive alignment is growing, no papers
discuss the impact of either realistic stimuli or incentive
alignment on the scale observed for the estimation data.
Furthermore, in practice, defaults in software leadmost
applications to use text-only stimuli without incentive
alignment.
Improving craft in CBC can be expensive. Some
ﬁrms, such as Procter & Gamble, Chrysler, and
General Motors, are sophisticated and spend sub-
stantially on CBC. Some CBC studies invest tens of
thousands of dollars to create realistic animated de-
scriptions of products and attributes complete with
training videos. And some include additional pretests
to assure that the stimuli are seen as realistic-to-
marketplace by consumers. Incentive alignment can
also be expensive: one CBC study gave 1 in 20 re-
spondents $300 toward a smartphone and another
gave every respondent $30 toward amusic-streaming
subscription (Koh 2012, McFadden 2014). Firms rou-
tinely use high-quality internet panels, often pay-
ing as much as $5–$10 for each respondent and up to
$50–$60 for hard-to-reach respondents. Our review
of the literature suggests that ﬁrms believe that each
of these investments increases the accuracy with
which relative partworths are estimated. On the other
hand,manyﬁrms reduceCBC costs by using text-only
attribute descriptions, no incentive alignment, less
sophisticated methods, convenience samples, and
small sample sizes. We show, in the stylized model
and by example empirically, that the managerial
implications of these craft decisions (and defaults)
are not trivial.
7.2. Modeling Decisions with Respect to CBC Craft
In Section 6.4, we temporarily assumed the ﬁrm be-
lieved the true scale to be accurate. True scale was the
scale that described how consumers would react to r,
s, and price in the marketplace. We are interested in
what happens if the ﬁrms (or testifying experts) shirk
on their investments in the craft of CBC studies. We
deﬁne two additional constructs: γmarket research is the
scale estimated by the CBC study, and may or may
not equal the true scale, and γasymptotic is the scale that
the ﬁrm would obtain with the highest possible level
of CBC craft. If craft were costless, the ﬁrm would
always seek the best craft in the hopes that γasymptotic
would approximate (unobserved) γtrue. But craft is
not costless.
We embed the game from Section 6 into a larger
game. We assume that if the ﬁrm invests more in CBC
craft, its estimate of scale becomes better, that is,
|γmarket research − γtrue | becomes smaller. (Strategic er-
rors can be made if γtrue is underestimated or over-
estimated.) To focus on scale in the stylized model, we
assume all (reasonable) CBC studies estimate the rel-
ative partworths correctly so that the ﬁrm knows that
r_s in R, s_r in S, and R> S. In Section 9.3, we in-
vestigate a double whammy whereby craft affects
both estimated scale and estimated relative part-
worths. Our results are complementary to research
to improve relative partworth estimates; hence, we
need not address the accuracy of relative partworths
in the stylized model.
It is sufﬁcient to illustrate the phenomenon in the
stylized model if we consider lower-cost and higher-
cost CBC studies such that γhigher  γtrue for the higher-
cost study and γlower≠ γtrue for the lower-cost study.
(In Sections 8 and 9, we demonstrate empirically that
costly craft affects γmarket research and that it is likely
that costly craft reduces |γmarket research − γtrue |.) For the
stylized model, we formally state the game order even
thoughwe can prove the results for other orders andwe
can relax many assumptions empirically.) The game
order is as follows:
1. The innovator decides whether to invest in the
lower-cost or the higher-cost CBC study. (To focus
on scale, we assumed that both CBC studies reveal
correctly that r_s in R, s_r in S, and R>S.)
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2. The innovator completes its CBC study and
observes γmarket research.i.
3. Based on its observed γmarket research.i, the inno-
vator announces and commits to either r or s.
4. The follower decides whether to invest in the lower-
cost or the higher-cost CBC study. (By assumption, both
CBC studies reveal that r_s in R, s_r in S, and R> S.)
5. The follower completes its CBC study and ob-
serves γmarket research.f . (The innovator has already acted;
the follower observes the innovator’s position, r or s.)
6. Based on its observed γmarket research.f , the follower
announces and commits to either r or s. (Because
the innovator has acted, the follower need not as-
sume anything about the innovator’s belief about
γmarket research.i.)
7. Both ﬁrms launch their products. The market-
place determines sales and price based on γtrue—the
scale that best describes consumer response. The
ﬁrms realize their proﬁts.
It will be obvious in Section 7.3 that the follower
could have made its craft decision before learning of
the innovator’s positioning—such a game ordering
would give the same results. Commitment to r or s im-
plicitly assumes that positioning decisions are “sticky,”
expensive, or based on know-how, patents, or copy-
rights. Once made, the ﬁrm cannot change its position-
ing even when the market price, market shares, and
proﬁts are not as forecast. Propositions 1 and 2 give us
sufﬁcient insight to understand the innovator’s and the
follower’s craft decisions. Online Appendix 14 ad-
dresses a game in which the innovator and follower
move simultaneously. The simultaneous game does
not determine which ﬁrm positions at r in a differ-
entiated market, but all other implications remain.
7.3 Innovator’s Strategic Positioning Decision Does
Not Depend on Observed Scale
The innovator chooses to target the larger segment (r)
in both Propositions 1 and 2, and thus the innovator
makes the same decision whether γmarket research  γtrue
or γmarket research≠γtrue. Because the innovator’s stra-
tegic positioning decision is independent of the ob-
served scale, investing in a higher-cost CBC study has
no effect on the innovator’s positioning strategy. (We
state and prove the result formally in Appendix B.)
The insight is consistent with recommendations in
product development (e.g., Urban and Hauser 1993,
Ulrich and Eppinger 2004). These texts advise inno-
vators to use market research to identify the best at-
tributes, but also advise that the accuracy need only be
sufﬁcient for a go/no-go decision.
7.4. Follower’s Strategic Positioning Decision
Depends on Observed Scale
If a naı¨ve follower underinvests in CBC craft and
observes γlower≠γtrue, and if either γlower <γcutoff <γtrue
or γlower >γcutoff >γtrue, then the follower makes a
strategic error by choosing the wrong strategic po-
sition (the wrong attribute level). We state and prove
the result formally in Appendix B. For example, if
γcutoff <γtrue, then Proposition 2 implies that the most
proﬁtable attribute level for the follower is s. How-
ever, if the follower acts on γmarket research  γlower, and if
γlower <γcutoff , then, by Proposition 1, the follower will
choose the less proﬁtable attribute level, r. In some
cases, the naı¨ve follower may underinvest in CBC
studies, but get lucky, say, if γtrue <γcutoff and γlower <
γcutoff . The ﬁrst inequality implies r is the follower’s
most proﬁtable attribute level, and the second in-
equality implies the follower chooses r. The important
insight is that if the naı¨ve follower underinvests in
the craft of a CBC study, then it is relying on luck to
make the right decision.
Although some authors interpret higher scale as a
surrogate for higher response accuracy (Toubia et al.
2004, Evgeniou et al. 2005), we interpret scale as more
accurate if |γmarket research − γtrue | is lower. A CBC study
that uses less costly craft can have higher estimated
scale, but those estimates can be less accurate for
representing the marketplace. For example, a CBC
study with two convenient attributes, text-only stim-
uli, and no incentive alignment might estimate that
scale is high because respondents answer choice tasks
more consistently. But the CBC study with such craft
might overestimate true scale because two text-based
attributes without incentive alignment may not ap-
proximate marketplace choices that are more de-
liberate and externally valid.
7.5. Sophisticated Bayesian Follower’s Decision on
Investments in CBC Studies
As ﬁrms become more sophisticated, they might use
Bayesian decision theory to decide whether to invest
in a higher-cost or lower-cost craft. For example, if the
follower can investK dollars to learn γtrue, the ﬁrm can
compare expected proﬁts, from acting optimally on
γtrue, to expected proﬁts based on the prior distri-
bution of γtrue. If the higher-cost study updates the
prior, the calculations take this into account. The
expected-value-of-sample-information calculations
are straightforward and provide no incremental insight
about craft decisions. For completeness, we provide
example calculations in Online Appendix 2.
7.6. Illustrative Example
In Online Appendix 1, we provide an illustrative
numerical example with βh  2, βℓ  1, uo  1, and
R  0.55. (R programs are available from the authors.)
The effect of γtrue on equilibrium prices is similar to
that observed for the empirical data in Figure 1. For
the vast majority of the range of scale, especially in
the range we observe in empirical data, equilibrium
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prices (and proﬁts) decrease with scale. Prices in-
crease slightly as γtrue→∞. The latter is a result of
multiple offsetting forces when the market ap-
proaches extreme behavior—very small increases in
price relative to competition have large impacts on
market shares. As predicted, differentiated positions
are most proﬁtable when γtrue is large, and undif-
ferentiated positions are most proﬁtable when γtrue is
small. In the illustrative example, we calculate γcutoff 
{γ : π*2rs(γ)  π*2rr(γ)} to be approximately 1.0. For the
illustrative example, opportunity losses for choosing
an incorrect strategic position are quite large.
7.7. Sensitivity of the Stylized Model to
Alternative Normalizations
All three normalizations imply the same stylized re-
sults. For the Allenby et al. (2014) normalization (γ 
µ  1), holding the ratios of βh/η and βℓ/η constant,
ﬁrms differentiate if η→∞ and choose not to differ-
entiate if η→ 0. For the Sonnier et al. (2007) normali-
zation (η  1, γ ≡ 1/µ), ﬁrms differentiate as µ→ 0
and choose not to differentiate as µ gets large.
8. Empirical Test: Smartwatches
It is reasonable to ask whether the phenomena we
study stylistically are sufﬁciently strong that they are
observable in empirical applications. Our empirical
applications relax the formalized assumptions of one
strategic attribute, two levels, two products, hetero-
geneity limited to two segments, homogeneous scale,
and homogeneous within-segment partworths. We
demonstrate that scale can be manipulated by differ-
ences in CBC craft and that recommended strategic price
and positioning decisions depend on whether scale is
adjusted with validation tasks. Empirically, scale drives
strategic decisions even when relative partworths do
not vary, when ﬁrms do not react to unobserved attri-
butes, and when we allow full heterogeneity.
To test the implications of the stylized theory, we
undertake CBC studies in a realistic product category
using multiple attributes, some with more than two
levels. We vary two representative aspects of craft while
maintaining other aspects at professional-level quality.
We test the implications of an example validation task.
8.1. Smartwatch CBC Studies
We focused on four attributes of smartwatches: case
color (silver or gold), watch face (round or rectan-
gular), watch band (black leather, brown leather, or
matching metal color), and price ($299, $349, $399, or
$449). We held all other attributes constant, including
brand and operating system. (In Section 9.4, we discuss
two studies with more attributes and a multitude
of levels.) We designed our stimuli so that any un-
observed attributes were unlikely to vary among
experimental conditions. By assumption in counterfactual
simulations, unobserved attributes were not used
strategically for positioning decisions.
We used 16 choice sets for estimation (and two as
internal holdouts) with three proﬁles per choice set.
We included the outside option via a dual-response
procedure (Meissner et al. 2016, Wlo¨mert and Eggers
2016).We followed standard survey design principles
including extensive pretesting (66 respondents) to
assure that (1) the questions, attributes, and tasks were
easy to understand; (2) that the manipulation of craft
between respondents was not subject to demand ar-
tifacts; and (3) that respondents did not report basing
decisions on any attributes that were not varied.
8.2. Image Realism and Incentive Alignment
We varied image realism and incentive alignment in a
2 × 2 between-subjects design. These aspects of CBC
craft are chosen as illustrative—we expect many as-
pects of craft to have strategic implications, including
the representativeness of the respondents, the com-
pleteness and clarity of the product attributes, the
type of questions (simple versus dual response), the
number of choice tasks, the number of proﬁles per choice
task, the quality of respondent training, and the quality
of partworth estimation. We chose incentive alignment
because of the growing academic interest in incentive
alignmentandbecauseof its proven impact onpredictive
ability, for example, in Ding (2007) and Ding et al.
(2005, 2011). We chose image realism because the
product-development literature suggests visual de-
pictions and animations provide nearly the same
results as physical prototypes and that rich visual rep-
resentations are more realistic than text and more
likely to evoke marketplace-like responses from
respondents (e.g., Vriens et al. 1998, Dahan and
Srinivasan 2000, Dahan and Hauser 2002). Further-
more, Dzyabura et al. (2019) suggest that conjoint
analysis with physical prototypes provides different
conjoint-analysis estimates than less realistic stimuli. Our
review of theMarketing Science literature (Section 7.1)
suggests that realistic images and incentive alignment
are rare in the academic literature and in practice.
8.2.1. Image Realism. After the screening questions,
respondents entered the CBC section. Following a
training task (not used in estimation), each respondent
chose repeatedly among three smartwatch proﬁles
and indicated whether he or she would purchase the
smartwatch. Respondents in the realistic-image exper-
imental cells saw high-realism images that attempted
to represent marketplace stimuli closely (Figure 2). To
make the images more realistic, the respondent could
toggle among a detailed view, a top view, and an app
view (not shown in Figure 2). Respondents in the less-
realistic-image cells saw only text-based stimuli (with
simple images) and coud not toggle among views
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(see Figure 3). Text-only stimuli are common in prac-
tice and are the defaults in most professional CBC
software packages. On the other hand, realistic images
are common in marketplace choices among smart-
watches (see https://www.apple.com/watch/compare/).
8.2.2. Incentive Alignment. In the incentive-aligned
experimental cells, respondents saw an animated
video to induce incentive alignment (https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=DBLPfRJo2Ho). Speciﬁcally,
respondents were told that 1 in 500 respondents
would receive a smartwatch and/or cash with a com-
bined value of $500, based on their answers to the
survey. Image realism in the video was matched to
image realism in the experimental cell (see Figure 4).
Respondents who were not in incentive-aligned ex-
perimental cells received the same cash offer, but the
cash was not tied to their answers.
8.3. Validation Task
The ideal external validation is whether the CBC
model predicts the choices consumers would make
if the hypothetical proﬁles were to become real
products in the marketplace. But most hypothetical
proﬁles will never be market tested. Instead, we
mimic marketplace choices by creating a “market”
that approximates the marketplace as closely as
feasible while controlling for unmodeled market-
ing actions. In this validation task, respondents chose
among 12 smartwatches and an outside option.
Twelve smartwatches represent all possible design
combinations. Price was chosen randomly (without
replacement) according tominimal overlap regarding
the design attributes. The resulting prices are almost
orthogonal to the design attributes. The task was
delayed three weeks to cleanse memory. We believe,
and an empirical posttest conﬁrms, that this valida-
tion task is perceived by respondents to be closer to
marketplace choices thanwithin-study holdout tasks.
(See Online Appendix 12 for an empirical posttest.
Marketplace market shares were not available for
the hypothetical smartwatch proﬁles in our experi-
ment.) If scale adjustment based on this validation task
affects strategic decisions, then we have demonstrated
the phenomenon empirically. Future research can ex-
plore other validation tasks such as those proposed by
Gilbride et al. (2008) and Wlo¨mert and Eggers (2016).
8.4. Sample
Our sample was drawn from a professional panel.2
We screened the sample so that respondents ex-
pressed interest in the category but did not own a
smartwatch,were based in theUnited States, were aged
20–69, and agreed to informed consent as required by
Figure 2. Realistic Images: Choice-Based Dual Response Task
Note. The images were animated allowing respondents to toggle views.
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our institutional review boards. Respondents in both
studies received standard panel incentives for par-
ticipating in the study.
Overall, 1,693 respondents completed theﬁrstwave
of studies, and, of these, 1,147 completed the delayed
validation task (68%). We considered respondents
who completed both the study and validation task. We
removed respondents who always chose the outside
option. There were no signiﬁcant differences between
the experimental cells and the exclusion of respon-
dents (p = 0.86). The ﬁnal sample size was 1,044 with
sample sizes varying from 248 to 275 among exper-
imental conditions. To illustrate the effect of CBC
craft, we focus on comparisons among the realistic-
image, incentive-aligned experimental cell (n = 270)
and the text-only, not-incentive-aligned experimental
cell (n = 275). In Section 9.2, we compare the effect of
realistic images to the effect of incentive alignment
using the full 2 × 2 design.
8.5. Estimation of Heterogeneous Partworths and
Scale: Standard HB CBC Model
We adopt a standard HB CBC estimation method
consistent with the stylized model. The basic utility
model generalizes the utility model in the stylized
model (recall that uij is consumer i’s utility for product
proﬁle j and pj is the price). For notational simplicity,
we state the utility for binary attributes recognizing
the standard generalization to multilevel attributes
(as in our empirical CBC studies). If proﬁle j has at-
tribute k, then ajk  1; otherwise ajk  −1. The utility
model is
uij  γi
(∑K
k1
βkiajk − pj
)
+ ij. (3)
The probability of choosing each proﬁle (or the out-
side option) is given by the standard logit model
analogous to that used for the stylized model. This
Figure 3. Lower-Quality Study: Choice-Based Dual Response Task (No Ability to Toggle)
Figure 4. Incentive Alignment Screenshot
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McFadden (2014) normalization is similar to the
normalization used by Sonnier et al. (2007) with
the exception that the latter estimate µi ≡ 1/γi. The
Allenby et al. (2014) normalization estimates an ex-
plicit price coefﬁcient ηi by setting γi  µi  1; hence,
scale is quantiﬁed by ηi. Empirically, strategic im-
plications from the three normalizations are not
significantly different (see Online Appendices 6, 7,
and 8).
Like Allenby et al. (2014, p. 436), we use a hierar-
chical estimation that assumes the observed data are
given by the choice model (as a function of the
βki
′s, γi
′s, and ajk′s). The βki’s and ln(γi)’s are distrib-
uted multivariate normal. We use a random-effects
speciﬁcation for scale allowing the means of the
distribution to vary according to the experimental
condition (see Section 8.6). The second-stage prior is
the standard Normal-inverted-Wishart conditionally
conjugate prior. Allenby et al. (2014) use the standard
relatively diffuse prior for the βki’s, but modify the prior
for ln(γi) to be more diffuse (ln(ηi) in their model).
Details are provided in Online Appendix 5 and by
Allenby et al. (2014), who provide graphical moti-
vation for the prior.
To avoid misspeciﬁcation errors, we tested for in-
teraction effects. We did not detect signiﬁcant im-
provements, and hence our ﬁnal model is based on
main effects. All settings not speciﬁed by Allenby et al.
(2014) followed standard procedures as in Sawtooth
Software (2015). For example, we used 10,000 burn-in
iterations for convergence and a subsequent 10,000
iterations to draw partworths and scale, from which
we kept every 10th draw. All subsequent summaries,
proﬁts, and other reported quantities are based on
the posterior distributions.
8.6. Identiﬁcation of Relative Scale as a Function of
Craft and Validation
We identify how scale changes as a function of craft
by using an experimental design. The ratio of scale
among experimental conditions is well deﬁned and
identiﬁed for all three normalizations. With two
experimental cells times two types of choice tasks
(estimation and validation), we identify three scale
adjustments, all relative to the text-only, not-incentive-
aligned, no-validation-adjustment factor, which we
normalize to 1.0. Accordingly, we estimate scale-
adjustment factors for the realistic-image, incentive-
aligned condition, λQh ; the validation task, λV ; and
their interaction, λQhV . Following Fiebig et al. (2010),
we use an exponential transformation to assure that
all scale factors are positive.
Let Qhi  1 if respondent iwas exposed to the realistic-
image, incentive-aligned condition (0, otherwise), and
let Vi  1 for respondent i’s validation task (0 for the
estimation tasks). Then we obtain
uij  γQVγi
(∑K
k1
βkiajk − pj
)
+ ij, (4)
where ln(γQV)  λQhQhi + λVVi + λQhVQhi Vi.
This speciﬁcation was estimated as a random-
effects model within a HB framework that assumes a
normal distribution for ln(γi) with means according
to ln(γQV). The priors are otherwise consistent. The
full speciﬁcation can be found in Online Appendix 6.
Following Bayesian principles, this speciﬁcation
uses all of the data simultaneously and rigorously.We
compared this speciﬁcation to an ad hoc method in
which we estimate parameters for each experimen-
tal cell using the CBC choice tasks and then use a
single-parameter logit model to estimate a scale-
adjustment factor between choice tasks and the vali-
dation task. The ad hoc speciﬁcation has the advan-
tage of separating relative partworth estimation from
scale-adjustment because the relative partworths are
estimated independently for each experimental cell.
When we compared the results, the speciﬁcation in
Equation (4) was highly correlated with the ad hoc
method (ρ = 0.995).
8.7. CBC Market-Research Quality and Validation
Affect Scale as Observed by the Firm
The posterior means and standard deviations of the
scale-adjustment posterior distributions of γQV are
given in Table 2. First, we notice that in the major-
ity of posterior draws (99%) for the estimation choice
proﬁles only, relative scale is higher for text-only
questions without incentive alignment than it is for
more realistic images with incentive alignment. If
scale is used as a surrogate for response accuracy as
in Evgeniou et al. 2005, Toubia et al. 2004, and others,
the ﬁrm might conclude that investments in realistic
images and incentive alignment reduced response
accuracy among the CBC proﬁles. But the goal is not
a higher scale based on CBC proﬁles; the goal is to
minimize |γmarket research − γtrue |.
Scale might be artiﬁcially inﬂated among text-only
choice tasks because it is easier for respondents to
answer such questions consistently, but at the same
time text-only choice tasks might be less predictive
of choices in a marketplace than incentive-aligned
questions based on stimuli that match the market-
place. To the extent that scale based on realistic im-
ages and incentive alignment and adjusted for the
validation task is our best estimate of γtrue, then
|γmarket research − γtrue | is best, by assumption, for the
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realistic-image, incentive-aligned, validation-adjusted
estimates. All relative comparisons make intuitive
sense. The next-best estimate is for realistic-image,
incentive-aligned, estimation-only scale, then text-
only, not-incentive-aligned, validation-adjusted scale.
The worst estimate is text-only, not-incentive-aligned,
estimation-only scale.
Table 2 isolates a scale effect. A common measure,
hit rates, isolate a relative-partworth effect. As ex-
pected, hit rates are substantially improved for the
realistic-image, incentive-aligned condition—hit rates
increase from 24% to 39% (chance is 7.7%) for the
validation task and from 64% to 77% (chance is 25%)
for the estimation task.
Uncertainty explained (U2; Hauser 1978) is based
on the joint accuracy of scale and relative partworths.
In our data, U2 increases for the realistic-image,
incentive-aligned condition—from 0.16 to 0.33 for
the validation task and from 0.34 to 0.53 for the es-
timation task. Based on the posterior distribution, all
differences (hit rates and U2) are signiﬁcant (see
Online Appendix 11). There was no draw in which
the text-only, not-incentive-aligned condition per-
formed better. Taken together, these results imply
that γmarket research is closer to γtrue for the realistic-
image, incentive-aligned condition.
The effects appear to be robust. For example, when
we use a mixture of normal distributions to estimate
upper-level heterogeneity or random splits of the
sample or the choice tasks used for the estimation, we
obtain the same basic results. Scale adjustment fac-
tors are also not affectedwhen using less data, neither
via splits of the sample nor choice tasks; only posterior
standard deviations increase for subsets of the sample
(see Online Appendix 8). The results are robust to al-
ternative model normalizations (see Section 9.1).
Table 2 is important for practice because the vast ma-
jority of CBC studies rely on unadjusted CBC-choice-
task-only estimates of scale. Text-only, not-incentive-
alignedmeasures based on estimation data alonemight
give the ﬁrm false conﬁdence because the analysis
overestimates scale, but increases |γmarket research − γtrue |.
We next show that errors due to over- or underesti-
mating scale have substantial strategic implications.
8.8. The Empirical Data Produce Strategic Effects
Analogous to Those in the Stylized Model
Table 1 previewed relative proﬁts as a function of
strategic positioning. We created Table 1 by holding
constant the (heterogeneous) relative partworths from
the smartwatch study, but counterfactually varying the
level of scale adjustment. (Unadjusted γi continues to
vary among respondents.) For each combination of
strategic positioning attributes (silver versus gold
color), we use the root-ﬁnding method described in
Allenby et al. (2014) to ﬁnd the price equilibria. In
order to avoid extrapolation beyond the price range
used in the CBC experiment, we cap prices at the upper
limit of the data ($449). Because more respondents
preferred silver to gold (65.7%) than vice versa, the
analogy to the stylizedmodel is r = silver, even though
“r” is mnemonically cumbersome for silver.
Using the same heterogeneous relative partworths,
we calculate γcutoff as the scale adjustment for which
the follower’s undifferentiated proﬁts (π*2rr) equal its
differentiated proﬁts (π*2rs). Numerically, γ
cutoff @ 0.6.
As an illustration only, we choose a true scale above
the cutoff (γtrue  0.8) and a true scale below the cutoff
(γtrue  0.4). If we assume that the true scale is 0.8 and
the market is 11.9 million units (Reisinger 2017), then
misestimating the true scale to be below the cutoff and
not differentiating from the innovator would result in
over a $100 million opportunity loss for the follower.
We obtained similar results when we used CBC sim-
ulators forwatch face (rectangular versus round),watch
band (black versus brown or other combinations), or
alternative model normalizations. In all counterfactual
tests using empirical HB CBC partworths, the market
always shifted from differentiated to undifferentiated
as (true) scale decreased through a critical value.
With γcutoff @ 0.6, we interpret the implications of
Table 2. For the text-only, no-incentive CBC study,
estimation-based scale implies differentiation, whereas
validation-based scale reverses the strategic recom-
mendation to no differentiation. For the realistic-image,
incentive-aligned CBC study, estimation-based scale
implies differentiation, whereas validation-based scale
implies that scale is close to the cutoff where differen-
tiation and no differentiation are equally proﬁtable.
Validation adjustment has strategic implications.
Table 2. Posterior Means of Relative Scale Adjustment
Text only, no incentive alignment Realistic images, incentive alignment
Scale is based on estimation choice tasks 1.00a 0.86
(n.a.) (0.06)
Scale is adjusted to validation task 0.35 0.61
(0.04) (0.06)
Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The full posterior distribution is available from the authors. n.a., not applicable.
aNormalized to 1.00 for identiﬁcation.
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9. Robustness Tests
9.1. Alternative Normalizations of Scale Do Not
Change the Results
We compare empirical estimates obtained from the
McFadden (2014) normalization in the stylizedmodel
(ηi  1 and γi log-normally distributed), the Sonnier
et al. (2007) normalization (ηi  1 and µi  1/γi log-
normally distributed), and the Allenby et al. (2014)
normalization (γi  1 and ηi log-normally distrib-
uted). The posterior means of the scale adjustments
vary slightly, but well within posterior conﬁdence
intervals. The implications of the stylized model are
not dependent on the empirical normalization. Ratio-
based WTP posterior means and medians are almost
identical between the McFadden (2014) normaliza-
tion, and the Sonnier et al. (2007) normalization. As
anticipated by Sonnier et al. (2007, pp. 315–317), ratio-
basedWTPposteriormeans varymore for theAllenby
et al. (2014) normalization, although median WTP
estimates reduce this variation. Detailed estimates
are provided in Online Appendix 10.
9.2. Realistic Images and Incentive Alignment, Each
Acting Alone, Affect Relative Scale
Table 3 extends the analyses in Table 2 to provide the
posterior means of the scale adjustments separately
for realistic images, incentive alignment, and their
interaction. The results suggest that using realistic
images impacts scale at least as much as incentive
alignment—more for validation-based adjustments.
The relative improvement due to realistic images is
about three times that of incentive alignment for
validation-based adjustments: 0.53 − 0.35  0.18 ver-
sus 0.41 − 0.35  0.06. Interactions increase both ef-
fects. If the hypothesis that image realism is more im-
portant than incentive alignment holds up, the results
are important. Whereas incentive alignment is gain-
ing traction in academia and in practice, much less
attention has been devoted to image realism.
9.3. Results Survive a Double Whammy If CBC Craft
Also Affects Relative Partworths
Although we focus on a common scale adjustment
due to CBC craft, CBC craft might also affect the
relative partworth distributions. To examine this
potential double whammy, we drew 1,000 times
from the posterior distributions to compare the rel-
ative partworths between experimental conditions.
The importances of the attributes are given by
Table 4. (Importance is the largest partworth minus the
smallest partworth for each attribute.) The price co-
efﬁcient for $150 (the price range in the experiment) is
normalized to 1.0 in Table 4 so that the importances
are relative to price. The effect of craft on relative
partworth distributions reinforces the effect on scale,
except for color, which is not signiﬁcantly different
between conditions. The estimated importances rel-
ative to price are larger for watch band andwatch face
when the study uses realistic images and incentive
alignment.
One interpretation is that the realistic images and
incentive alignment encouraged respondents to eval-
uate attribute importances more carefully (see also
Vriens et al. 1998). However, we cannot rule out sit-
uations where greater respondent motivation and
more realistic descriptions cause respondents to de-
crease valuations of attribute importances.
9.4. The StylizedModel and Empirical Results Apply
for More Products and/or Attributes
The smartwatch application focused on two products
and four attributes, but empirical studies often have
more products, more attributes, and more levels. For
example, Allenby et al. (2014) estimate price equi-
libria for a digital camera market with four brands
and seven attributes, representing a total of 17 levels,
plus an outside option. We also obtained data from a
nationwide study of student preferences for dormi-
tories with seven attributes representing a total of 24
levels. These data replicate a CBC study that a U.S.
university used to design new dormitories.
Online Appendix 4 computes counterfactual equi-
libria prices as scale adjustment varies. For both ap-
plications, the equilibria prices vary, as in Figure 1. For
the camera application, equilibria prices vary from
$275 to $195 as scale increases from 0.6 to 1.2. For the
dormitory application, equilibria rents vary from
$1,500 to $1,180 as scale increases from 0.5 to 1.2.
Table 3. Posterior Means of Scale Adjustment for Realistic Images and Incentive Alignment
Text-only no incentive
alignment
Main effect of realistic
images
Main effect of incentive
alignment
Realistic images × incentive
alignment
Scale is based on estimation
data
1.00a 0.89 0.96 0.86
(n.a.) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Scale is adjusted to
validation task
0.35 0.53 0.41 0.61
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The full posterior distribution is available from the authors. n.a., not applicable.
aNormalized to 1.00 for identiﬁcation.
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9.5. Computation is Feasible
The empirical equilibrium calculations require that
we solve a ﬁxed-point problem for every draw from
the posterior distribution of partworths. This procedure
is computationally intensive, but feasible. For exam-
ple, on a standard Apple MacBook Pro computer with
a 2.7 GHz Intel Core i5 processor and 8 GB of mem-
ory, using programs written in R, the equilibrium
prices for the Allenby et al. (2014) camera data with
ﬁve alternatives and n = 10,000 draws of the hyper-
parameters were computed in an average of 2.85
seconds per draw (standard deviation = 0.99 seconds,
~48 minutes for 1,000 draws).
10. Managerial Implications and
Future Research
10.1. Summary of Implications
The stylized model and our empirical tests highlight
the large impact of scale-factor differences driven
by seemingly innocuous differences in CBC craft.
Whereas many researchers focus on the impact of het-
erogeneous scale in CBC estimation, few CBC re-
searchers explore the impact of a common scale factor
on equilibrium prices and proﬁts.
Moreover, although many researchers focus on the
impact of scale in logit models on strategic posi-
tioning, most explanations involve heterogeneity in
preferences or unobserved attributes. We demon-
strate that neither are necessary and that scale affects
strategic decisions even when modern (HB CBC, la-
tent structure, ormachine learning) estimation is used
and researchers are careful to include a complete set
of attributes.
Our results suggest that when equilibrium prices are
used to replace WTP calculations, equilibrium-price es-
timates are extremely sensitive to craft. Image realism,
incentive alignment, and likely other seemingly minor
craft investments have impacts in the range of tens to
hundreds of millions of dollars. Adjusting scale using
a validation task likewise has a huge impact.
10.2. Recommendations for Practice
If craft were costless, we would recommend that ﬁrms
use the best possible craft including realistic images and
incentive alignment (and other yet-to-be-tested aspects
of craft). We also recommend validation adjustment.
Better craft and validation-adjustment likely minimize
|γmarket research − γtrue |. But γtrue is latent until the prod-
uct is actually launched to the marketplace and ﬁrms,
particularly followers, must decide whether to invest
in costly craft and validation. Fortunately, for strate-
gic positioning, ﬁrms need not know γtrue exactly.
Firms need only compare the posterior distributions
of γmarket research to γcutoff to be reasonably conﬁdent
that they can distinguish among π*2rs(γ)≫π*2rr(γ),
π*2rs(γ)≪π*2rr(γ), and π*2rs(γ) ≈ π*2rr(γ). Firms can use
formal expected-value-of-sample-information calcu-
lations, but we expect that managerial judgment on
|γmarket research − γcutoff | will be more common and will
improve with further research. See also Online Ap-
pendix 3.
10.3. Recommendations for Research
Our empirical tests suggest research to explore the
implications of craft, validation adjustment, scale,
equilibrium prices, and strategic positioning. Spe-
ciﬁcally, we propose the following: (1) Test other
aspects of craft to see whether they impact strategic
decisions dramatically. (2) Improve the validation
task to better estimate γtrue. (3) Attempt to estimate
γtrue in the marketplace. (4) Compare validation-
adjusted scale factors. (5) Test the sensitivity of equi-
librium prices beyond the three empirical applications.
(6) Test the sensitivity of strategic positioning beyond
the smartwatch study. (7) Test whether image realism
is more important than incentive alignment. (8) Test
under which conditions validation adjustment lowers
estimated scale. (9) Develop rules of thumb about the
impact on scale of craft and validation adjustment.
(10) Develop experiments that isolate and explore person-
speciﬁc (and/or time-speciﬁc) scale effects that are not
otherwise modeled.
Table 4. Posterior Means of Relative Importances
Text only, no incentive alignment Realistic images, incentive alignment
Color 1.39 1.33
(0.05) (0.05)
Watch band 1.88 2.46
(0.07) (0.08)
Watch face 1.38 1.60
(0.06) (0.07)
Price 1.00 1.00
(n.a.) (n.a.)
Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The full posterior distribution is available from the
authors. n.a., not applicable.
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Appendix B. Proofs of Results and Propositions
Throughout this appendix, for notational simplicity, we drop
the superscript onγtrue and write it simply as γ. Results in this
appendixare stated innotationalshorthand,butare thesameas
those in the text. All proofs assume η is normalized to 1.
Result B.1. For γ→ 0, π*2rr >π
*
2rs, π
*
1rs >π
*
1rr, and π
*
1rs >π
*
2rs.
Proof. This proof addresses ﬁrst-order conditions. We ad-
dress second-order and cross-partial conditions when we
examine existence and uniqueness later in this appendix.
As γ→ 0, the logit curve becomes extremely ﬂat, which
motivates a Taylor’s series expansion of market share around
βh  βℓ. When βh  βℓ, the logit equations for the market
shares are identical for ﬁrms 1 and 2; identical for all
Appendix A. Summary of Notation
i Indexes consumers
j Indexes ﬁrms; ﬁrm 1 is the innovator, and ﬁrm 2 is the follower
ajk Indicator function; ajk  1 if proﬁle j has attribute k, ajk  −1 otherwise
cj Firm j’s marginal cost
Cj Firm j’s ﬁxed costs
r A product attribute; we can think of r as red (or rose, regular, round, or routine)
s Aproduct attribute; we can think of s as silver (or sapphire, small, square, or special); a ﬁrm’s product can have either r
or s, but it cannot have both or neither
pj Firm j’s price
p*jrr Nash equilibrium price for ﬁrm j given that ﬁrm 1 chooses r and ﬁrm 2 chooses r; deﬁne p
*
jrs, p
*
jsr, and p
*
jss analogously
Pijrr Probability that consumer i purchases product from ﬁrm j given that ﬁrm 1 chooses r and ﬁrm 2 chooses r; deﬁne Pijrs,
Pijsr, and Pijss analogously
PRjrr Probability that a consumer in segment R purchases product from ﬁrm j given that ﬁrm 1 chooses r and ﬁrm 2
chooses r; deﬁne PRjrs, PRjsr, PRjss, PSjrs, PSjsr, and PSjss, analogously
R Size of segment R; we use italics for the size of the segment; non-italics to name the segment
S Size of segment S
WTP Willingness to pay
HB CBC Hierarchical Bayes choice-based conjoint
uij Utility that consumer i perceives for ﬁrm j’s product
uio Utility that consumer i perceives for the outside option
uo Utility of outside option for segments R and S
uRj Utility of ﬁrm j’s product among consumers in segment R
uSj Utility of ﬁrm j’s product among consumers in segment S
V Number (measure) of consumers
βri Relative partworth for r for consumer i
βsi Relative partworth for s for consumer i
βrR Relative partworth of r for all i∈ R; deﬁne βsR, βrS, and βsS analogously
βh Higher partworth, βrR  βsS  βh
βℓ Lower partworth, βrS  βsR  βℓ; theory holds if βℓ normalized to zero, but is less intuitive
βki Relative partworth for attribute k and consumer i
δrj Indicator function for whether ﬁrm j’s product has attribute r; deﬁne δsj analogously
ij Error term for consumer i for ﬁrm j’s product; errors are independent and identically distributed extreme value
random variables
ηi Price coefﬁcient, normalized to 1 in the stylized model and some empirical applications
γi Scale when ηi normalized to 1; larger values imply smaller relative magnitude of the error term
γasymptotic Scale obtained with theoretically best quality market research
γcutoff cutoff value for scale; γ>γcutoff implies differentiation; γ<γcutoff no differentiation
γhigher, γlower Scale as affected by higher- or lower-cost market research
γQV Scale adjustment due to experimental cell and/or validation task
γtrue The true scale (sometimes γ for notational simplicity in proofs if not confused with γi)
λQh , λV , λQhV Used to identify scale effects for market-research-quality conditions (Qhi , Vi indicators)
µi Sonnier et al. (2007) renormalization such that γi ≡ 1/µi
πj Proﬁts for ﬁrm j
π*jrr Proﬁts for ﬁrm j at the Nash equilibrium prices; deﬁne π
*
jrs, π
*
jsr, and π
*
jss analogously
ΔR2rr Deﬁned in the proof to Result B.1; ΔS2rr and other terms for rs, sr, and ss are deﬁned analogously
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strategies, rr, rs, sr, and ss; and symmetric with respect to ﬁrm
1 and ﬁrm 2. Thus, at βh  βℓ, we have
p*1rr  p*2rr  p*1rs  p*2rs  p at βh  βℓ,
P*R1rr  P*R2rr  P*R1rs  P*R2rs  P at βh  βℓ,
P*S1rr  P*S2rr  P*S1rs  P*S2rs  P at βh  βℓ.
Because the prices and shares are identical, we have
π*1rr  π*2rr  π*1rs  π*2rs 
1
γ
P
1 − P at β
h  βℓ,
where the last step comes from substituting the equalities
for P in the implicit ﬁrst-order conditions and simplifying
usingR + S  1. Similar equations apply for rs, sr, and ss and
ﬁrm 2:
∂PR1rr
∂p1rr
 −γ
trueeγ
true(βh−p1rr)[eγtrue(βh−p2rr) + eγtrueuo ]
[eγtrue(βh−p1rr) + eγtrue(βh−p2rr) + eγtrueuo ]2
 −γtruePR1rr(1 − PR1rr),
∂π1rr
∂p1rr
RPR1rr + SPS1rr − γtruep1rr{RPR1rr(1 − PR1rr)
+ SPS1rr(1 − PS1rr)}  0,
p*1rr 
1
γtrue
RP*R1rr + SP*S1rr
RP*R1rr(1 − P*R1rr) + SP*S1rr(1 − P*S1rr)
,
π*1rr 
1
γtrue
(RP*R1rr + SP*S1rr)2
RP*R1rr(1 − P*R1rr) + SP*S1rr(1 − P*S1rr)
.
We obtain the optimal price by solving the following
ﬁxed-point problem in p:
γp  1
1 − P 
2e−γp + eγuo
e−γp + eγuo using P 
e−γp
2e−γp + eγuo .
Because the right-hand side is decreasing in p on the range
[1, 1.5], there will be exactly one solution in the range of
γp∈ [1, 1.5] for small γ. We compute the partial derivatives of
the P’s at βh  βℓ:
∂PR2rr
∂βh
 γP(1 − 2P) ≡ γΔR2rr,
∂PS2rr
∂βh
 0 ≡ γΔS2rr,
∂PR2rs
∂βh
 −γP2 ≡ γΔR2rs,
∂PS2rs
∂βh
 γP(1 − P) ≡ γΔS2rs,
Δ  βh − βℓ.
We now use a Taylor’s series expansion with respect to
βh. Using standard mathematical arguments, higher-order
terms that are O(γ2) or higher vanish as γ→ 0. (The ratio
of terms O(γ2) or higher to terms O(γ) goes to zero as γ→ 0.)
Substituting the expressions for the partial derivatives into
the ﬁrst-order conditions, multiplying by γ, and using the
above notation, we obtain
γπ*2rr 
[R(P + γΔR2rrΔ) + S(P + γΔS2rrΔ]2 +O(γ2)
[R(P + γΔR2rrΔ)((1 − P) − γΔR2rrΔ) +
S(P + γΔS2rrΔ)((1 − P) − γΔS2rrΔ) +O(γ2)]
,
γπ*2rr 
P2 + 2γΔ(RΔR2rr + SΔS2rr) +O(γ2)
P(1 − P) + γΔ(1 − 2P)(RΔR2rr + SΔS2rr) +O(γ2).
Similarly,
γπ*2rs 
P2 + 2γΔ(RΔR2rs + SΔS2rs) +O(γ2)
P(1 − P) + γΔ(1 − 2P)(RΔR2rs + SΔS2rs) +O(γ2).
Because all terms in the numerators and denominators of
γπ*2rr and γπ
*
2rs are clearly positive, the condition for γπ
*
2rr >
γπ*2rs for γ→ 0 becomes
P2 + 2γΔ(RΔR2rr + SΔS2rr)[P(1 − P) + γΔ(1 − 2P)(RΔR2rs
+ SΔS2rs)]>P2 + 2γΔ(RΔR2rs + SΔS2rs)[P(1 − P)
+ γΔ(1 − 2P)(RΔR2rs + SΔS2rs)].
After simpliﬁcation and ignoring terms that are O(γ2), this
expression reduces to
γΔP[(RΔR2rr + SΔS2rr) − (RΔR2rs + SΔS2rs)][2 − 3P + 2P2]> 0.
We need only show that both terms in brackets are positive.
We show the ﬁrst term in brackets is positive because
(RΔR2rr + SΔS2rr) − (RΔR2rs + SΔS2rs)
 (RP(1 − P) − RP2) − (SP(1 − P) − RP2)> 0.
The last step follows from R>S. We show the second term is
positive because its minimum occurs at P  34 and its value at
this minimum is 2 − 3P + 2P2  78. Thus, 2 − 3P + 2P2 is pos-
itive for all P∈ [0, 1].
To prove that π*1rs >π
*
1rr for γ→ 0, we use another Taylor’s
series expansion and simplify by the same procedures that
recognize that higher-order terms vanish. Most of the algebra
is the same until we come down to the following term in
brackets (now reversed because rs is more proﬁtable for ﬁrm 1
than rr as γ→ 0). Taking derivatives gives
∂PR1rr
∂βh
 γP(1 − 2P) ≡ γΔR1rr,
∂PS1rr
∂βh
 0 ≡ γΔS1rr,
∂PR1rs
∂βh
 γP(1 − P) ≡ γΔR1rs,
∂PS1rs
∂βh
 −γP2 ≡ γΔS1rs.
The corresponding expression in brackets becomes (for
γπ*1rs − γπ*1rr)
(RΔR1rs + SΔS1rs) − (RΔR1rr + SΔS1rr)
 (RP(1 − P) − SP2) − (RP(1 − P) − RP2)> 0,
where the last step is true because R> S.
By exploiting symmetry, we have π*1rr  π*2rr, yielding the
result that π*1rs >π
*
1rr  π*2rr >π*2rs. □
Lemma B.1. γp*1rs < (1 − P*R1rs)−1 and γp*2rs < (1 − P*S2rs)−1. Re-
lated conditions hold for rr, ss, and sr.
Proof. We use the ﬁrst-order conditions (for rs) given in the
proof to Result B.1. All terms are positive, so we cross mul-
tiply. After cross multiplying, the ﬁrst expression is equivalent
to RP*R1rs(1−P*R1rs)+SP*S1rs(1−P*S1rs)>RP*R1rs(1−P*R1rs)+SP*S1rs
(1−P*R1rs), which is true if P*R1rs >P*S1rs. The latter holds when-
ever βh > βℓ for all γ by substituting directly into the logit
equation.Weprove the second expression by using theﬁrst-order
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conditions for p*2rs. Related expressions hold for other position-
ings. For example, for the rr positions, γp*1rr < (1 − P*R1rr)−1 and
γp*2rr < (1 − P*R2rr)−1.
Result B.2. Suppose βh is sufﬁciently larger than uo and
uo ≥ βℓ. Then, there exists a sufﬁciently large γ such that π*2rs >
π*2rr, π
*
1rs >π
*
1rr, and π
*
1rs >π
*
2rs.
Proof. In this proof, we examine the ﬁrst-order conditions.
Second-order and cross-partial conditions are addressed
when we consider existence and uniqueness later in this
appendix. We ﬁrst recognize that
PS1rs  e
γ(βℓ−p1)
eγ(βℓ−p1) + eγ(βh−p2) + eγuo ,
PR1rs  e
γ(βh−p1)
eγ(βh−p1) + eγ(βℓ−p2) + eγuo ,
PR2rs  e
γ(βℓ−p2)
eγ(βh−p1) + eγ(βℓ−p2) + eγuo ,
PS2rs  e
γ(βh−p2)
eγ(βℓ−p1) + eγ(βh−p2) + eγuo ,
PR2rr  e
γ(βh−p2)
eγ(βh−p1) + eγ(βh−p2) + eγuo ,
PS2rr  e
γ(βℓ−p2)
eγ(βℓ−p1) + eγ(βℓ−p2) + eγuo .
When γ is large relative to β and uo, PS1rr  PS2rr ≈ 0,
PR2rs ≈ 0, and PS1rs ≈ 0. Substituting and using algebra to
simplify the ﬁrst-order conditions gives us
γp*2rs 
RP*R2rs + SP*S2rs
RP*R2rs(1 − P*R2rs) + SP*S2rs(1 − P*S2rs)
@
SP*S2rs
SP*S2rs(1 − P*S2rs)
 1
1 − P*S2rs
.
We substitute the logit model directly for PS2rs and simplify
algebraically to obtain
γp*2rs@
eγ(βh−p*2rs) + eγ(βℓ−p*1rs) + eγuo
eγ(βℓ−p*1rs) + eγuo @ e
γ(βh−uo−p*2rs) + 1.
As γ gets large and positive, the effect of γ as an exponent is
much larger than the effect of γ as a multiplier; thus, the
expression in parentheses in the exponent must converge
toward zero for the equality to hold. As the expression ap-
proaches zero, the solution to this ﬁxed point problem
approaches p*2rs  βh − uo −  where > 0,  is but a fraction
of βh − uo, and → 0 as γ→∞. Thus, π*2rs  p*2rs(RP*R2rs +
SP*S2rs) @ p*2rsSP*S2rs @ SP*S2rs(βh − uo − ). (The ﬁrst expression
is by the deﬁnition of π*2rs.) Substituting p
*
2rs into the ex-
pression for P*S2rs, we get
P*S2rs 
eγ(uo+)
eγ(uo+) + eγuo + eγ(βℓ−p*1rs) >
eγ(uo+)
eγ(uo+) + eγuo + eγ(uo−p*1rs) >
1
3
.
Thus, using PR2rs ≈ 0, the solution to the ﬁxed point
problem, and the deﬁnition of π*2rs, we have shown that π
*
2rs is
greater than S(βh − uo)/3 as γ→∞. (P*S2rs actually gets close to
1 and π*2rs gets close to S(βh − uo) as γ→∞, but we only need
the weaker lower bound.)
Thus, for sufﬁciently large γ (relative to βh and uo), the
solution of π*2rs is greater than S(βh − uo)/3. Similar arguments
establish that π*1rs@R(βh − uo − )P*R1rs and that π*1rs is greater
than R(βh − uo)/3. (Recall that → 0 as γ→∞.)
We examine the price equilibrium when both ﬁrm 1 and
ﬁrm 2 choose r. We ﬁrst recognize that, by symmetry,
p*1rr  p*2rr. Hence,
PR2rr  e
γ(βh−p*2rr)
2eγ(βh−p*2rr) + eγuo and
PS2rr  e
γ(βℓ−p*2rr)
2eγ(βℓ−p*2rr) + eγuo .
We seek to show that there is a p*2rr, with the properties that
p*2rr≪ βh − uo and p*2rr < uo, which satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order
conditions. In this case, as γ→∞, P*R2rr@ 12. The ﬁrst-order
conditions become
γp*2rr 
RP*R2rr + SP*S2rr
RP*R2rr(1 − P*R2rr) + SP*S2rr(1 − P*S2rr)
@
1
2R + SP*S2rr
1
4R + SP*S2rr(1 − P*S2rr)
≤
1
2R + S
1
4R
 2 + 4 S
R
< 6.
The third to last step, setting P*S2rr  1 for the inequality,
is possible because the fraction increases in P*S2rr to obtain its
maximum at P*S2rr=1, as shown with simple calculus. Thus, if
p*2rr satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order conditions, then p
*
2rr < 6/γ. Putting
the upper bound on π*2rr together with the lower bound on
π*2rs, π
*
2rr <
6
γ
(
1
2R + S
)
< 92γ<
1
3S(βh − uo)<π*2rs for γ sufﬁciently
large. (We use the condition that βh > uo by a sufﬁcient
amount.) We establish π*1rr <π
*
1rs by similar arguments rec-
ognizing that, by symmetry, π*1rr  π*2rr and using the proven
result that π*1rs is greater than
1
3R(βh − uo) for sufﬁciently
large γ. □
Result B.3. π*1rr  π*2rr >π*1ss  π*2ss.
Proof. We examine the equations for the segment-based
market shares to recognize that PR1rr (p*1ss, p*2ss)  P*S1ss (p*1ss,
p*2ss) and PS1rr (p*1ss,p*2ss)P*R1ss (p*1ss,p*2ss), and P*S1ss (p*1ss, p*2ss)>
P*R1ss (p*1ss, p*2ss). Thus, π*1rr  π1rr (p*1rr,p*2rr) ≥ π1rr (p*1ss,p*2ss) 
p*1ss[RPR1rr (p*1ss, p*2ss) + SPS1rr (p*1ss, p*2ss)]p*1ss[RP*S1ss+SP*R1ss]>
p*1ss[SP*S1ss+RP*R1ss]π*1ss . The second inequality is by the
principle of optimality. The last inequality uses R> S and
P*S1ss >P
*
R1ss. The equalities, π
*
1rr  π*2rr and π*1ss  π*2ss, are by
symmetry. □
Result B.4. Suppose βh is sufﬁciently larger than uo and
uo ≥ βℓ. Then, there exists a sufﬁciently large γ such that
π*1rs >π
*
1sr.
Proof. By symmetry, we recognize that π*1sr  π*2rs. In the
proof to Result B.2, we established that π*2rs@ S(βh − uo)P*S2rs
and π*1rs@R(βh − uo)P*R1rs because → 0 as γ→∞. We also
see that the ﬁxed-point problems are identical for p*1rs
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and p*2rs; thus, as γ→∞, p*1rs@ p*2rs, which implies that
P*R1rs@P
*
S2rs. Putting these relationships together implies
that π*1rs @R(βh − uo)P*R1rs > S(βh − uo)P*R1rs @ S(βh − uo)P*S2rs @
π*2rsπ*1sr. □
Proposition 1. For low true scale (γtrue→ 0), the innovator (ﬁrm 1)
targets the larger segment (r), and the follower chooses not to differ-
entiate. The follower targets the larger segment (r).
Proposition 2. If βh is sufﬁciently larger than uo and if uo ≥ βℓ,
then there exists a sufﬁciently large γtrue such that the innovator
targets the larger segment (r), and the follower chooses to differ-
entiate by targeting the smaller segment (s).
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2. We prove the two prop-
ositions together. Result B.1 establishes that π*2rr >π
*
2rs as
γ→ 0. Result B.2 establishes that π*2rs >π
*
2rr when γ is sufﬁ-
ciently large. Thus, if ﬁrm 1 chooses r, ﬁrm 2 chooses r as
γ→ 0 and chooses s when γ gets sufﬁciently large.
To prove that ﬁrm 1 always chooses r, we ﬁrst consider the
case where γ→ 0. If ﬁrm 1 chooses r, then ﬁrm 2 chooses r by
Proposition 1. Suppose instead that ﬁrm 1 chooses s; then ﬁrm
2 will choose r. Firm 2 will choose r in this case because, by
Result B.1, π*1rs >π
*
1rr, and by symmetry, π
*
2sr  π*1rs; hence,
π*2sr >π
*
1rr  π*2rr. If ﬁrm 2 would choose r whenever ﬁrm 1
chooses s, ﬁrm 1would earn π*1sr. But π
*
1sr  π*2rs by symmetry
and π*2rs <π
*
2rr  π*1rr by Result B.1. Thus, ﬁrm 1 earns more
proﬁts (π*1rr) by choosing r than the proﬁts it would obtain
(π*1sr) by choosing s.
We now consider the case where γ is sufﬁciently large.
Suppose ﬁrm 1 chooses r; then ﬁrm 2 will choose s by
Result B.2. Firm 1 receives π*1rs. Suppose instead that ﬁrm 1
chooses s; then ﬁrm 2 will choose r because π*2sr  π*1rs by
symmetry and π*1rs >π
*
1ss  π*2ss under the conditions of
Result B.2. Thus, if ﬁrm 1 chooses s, it receives π*1sr. Because
π*1rs >π
*
1sr by Result B.4, ﬁrm 1 will choose r. □
Existence and Uniqueness
The existence and uniqueness arguments require sub-
stantial algebra. To avoid an excessively long appendix, we
provide the basic insight. Detailed calculations are available
from the authors. The proofs to Result B.1–Result B.4 rely on
the ﬁrst-order conditions; thus we must show that a solu-
tion to the ﬁrst-order conditions, if it exists, satisﬁes the
second-order conditions. We seek to show that the second-
order conditions for the rs positions are negative at equilib-
rium. Taking derivatives, we obtain the following second-
order conditions for the rs positions:
∂2π*1rs
∂p21rs
 − γRP*R1rs(1 − P*R1rs)[2 − γp*1rs(1 − 2P*R1rs)]
− γSP*S1rs(1 − P*S1rs)[2 − γp*1rs(1 − 2P*S1rs)].
Weuse LemmaB.1 to substitute (1 − P*R1rs)−1 forγp*1rs. The
former is a larger value, so if the conditions hold for
the larger value, they hold for γp*1rs. Algebra simpliﬁes
the right-hand side of the second-order condition to
−γ{RP*R1rs(1 − P*R1rs) + SP*S1rs(1 − P*S1rs)(1 − 2P*R1rs + 2P*S1rs)}.
With direct substitution in the logit model, recognizing
p*1rs ≥ p*2rs, we show P*S2rs ≥P*R1rs ≥P*R2rs ≥P*S1rs. (We show
p*1rs ≥ p*2rs with implicit differentiation of the ﬁrst-order
conditions with respect to R.) These inequalities imply
that P*S1rs < min{P*R1rs, 1 − P*R1rs}. Hence, RP*R1rs(1 − P*R1rs) ≥
SP*S1rs(1 − P*S1rs) whenever R> S. Thus, the second-order
condition is more negative than −γSP*S1rs(1 − P*S1rs)(2−
2P*R1 + 2P*S1)< 0. We repeat the analysis for p*2rs using a
sufﬁcient technical condition that either P*S2rs ≤ 12 or that the
ratio of S/R is above a minimum value. (The condition, not
shown here, requires only S> 0 as γ→∞.) Although our
proof formally imposes the technical sufﬁcient condition,
we have not found any violation of the second-order
conditions at equilibrium, even with small S. Thus, with
a (possible) mild restriction on S, the second-order condi-
tions are satisﬁed whenever the ﬁrst-order conditions hold.
We now establish that the second-order conditions
are satisﬁed on a compact set. We begin by showing al-
gebraically that (1 − P*R1rs)−1 is decreasing in p1rs and that
it decreases from a ﬁnite positive value, which we call
FR1rs (p1rs  0)> 1 . As p1rs→∞, (1 − P*R1rs)−1decreases to 1.
But γp1rs increases from 0 to ∞; thus, there must be a so-
lution to γp1rs  (1 − PR1rs)−1 for every p2rs. Call this solution
pm1rs (p2rs). Because (1 − P*R1rs)−1 is decreasing in γp1rs, it must
be true that γp1rs ≤ (1 − PR1rs)−1 for all p1rs ∈ [0, pm1rs (p2rs)].
Using similar arguments, we show there exists a pm2rs (p1rs)
such that γp2rs ≤ (1 − PS2rs)−1for all p2rs ∈ [0, pm2rs (p1rs)]. To-
gether, p1rs ∈ [0, pm1rs (p2rs)] and p2rs ∈ [0, pm2rs (p1rs)] deﬁne a
compact set that is a subset of p1rs ∈ [0, pm1rs(0)] and
p2rs ∈ [0, pm2rs(0)]. (The term pm1rs (p2rs) is continuous and de-
creasing in p2rs, and pm2rs (p1rs) is continuous and decreas-
ing in p1rs; pm1rs (p2rs), pm2rs (p1rs)> 0.) We have already estab-
lished that P*S2rs ≥P*R1rs ≥P*R2rs ≥P*S1rs when p*1rs ≥ p*2rs. If we
restrict the compact set to p1rs ≥ p2rs and the price differ-
ence is not too large, we have PS2rs ≥PR1rs ≥PR2rs ≥PS1rs on
the set. This simpliﬁes the proof, but is not necessary. Thus,
we can choose a compact set such that γp1rs  (1 − PR1rs)−1,
γp2rs ≤ (1 − PS2rs)−1, and PS2rs ≥PR1rs ≥PR2rs ≥PS1rs on the set.
This set contains the interior solution to the ﬁrst-order
conditions. Using arguments similar to those we used for
the equilibrium prices, we establish that the second-order
conditions hold on this compact set. If necessary,we impose
a weak technical condition on S/R. This implies that both
proﬁt functions are concave on the compact set. Concavity
on a compact set guarantees that the solution exists and, by
the arguments in the previous paragraph, that the solution
is an interior solution. Numerical calculations, for a wide
variety of parameter values, suggest that the second-order
conditions hold on the compact set, that the second-order
conditions hold outside the set (the restrictions are sufﬁ-
cient but not necessary), that the second-order conditions
hold for prices satisfying p2rs > p1rs, and that, at equilibrium,
the second-order conditions hold for all S.
The proof for the rr positions follows arguments that are
similar to those for the rs positions. We do not need the
technical condition on S because P*S2rr ≤ 12 implies that S> 0 is
sufﬁcient. The compact set is simpler because p*1rr  p*2rr by
symmetry. The proofs for the sr and ss positions use related
conditions and follow the logic of the proofs for the rs and rr
positions. □
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Uniqueness requires that we examine the cross-partial
derivatives, illustrated here for rs:
∂2π1rs
∂p1rs∂p2rs
 γRPR1rsPR2rs[1 − γp1rs(1 − 2PR1rs)]
+ γRPS1rsPS2rs[1 − γp1rs(1 − 2PS1rs)].
Restricting ourselves to the a compact set as in the existence
arguments,we canuseγp1rs≤1/(1−PR1rs), γp2rs ≤ 1/(1 − PS2rs),
and PS2rs ≥PR1rs ≥PR2rs ≥PS1rs. We substitute to show that
when the cross-partial derivative is positive (similar con-
ditions and a similar proof apply when it is negative),⃒⃒⃒
⃒⃒∂2π1rs
∂p21rs
⃒⃒⃒
⃒⃒ −
⃒⃒⃒
⃒⃒ ∂2π1rs
∂p1rs∂p2rs
⃒⃒⃒
⃒⃒≥ γ
1 − PR1rs
{
RPR1rs(1 − PR1rs)2
+ R(1 − PR1rs − PR2rs)P2R1rs
+ SPS1rs(1 − PS1rs)(1 − PR1rs)
+ SPS1rs(1 − PS1rs − PS2rs)
· (2PS1rs − PR1rs)}.
We substitute further to show the third term on the right-
hand side is larger than the, possibly negative, fourth term.
Hence, the cross-partial condition is positive for π1rs on the
compact set. The cross-partial condition for π2rs is satisﬁed
with a technical condition on S. Numerical calculations, for
a wide variety of parameter values, suggest that the cross-
partial conditions hold on the compact set, that the cross-
partial conditions hold outside the set (the restrictions are
sufﬁcient but not necessary), that the cross-partial conditions
hold for prices satisfying p2rs > p1rs, and that, at equilibrium,
the cross-partial conditions hold for all S.
In summary, subject to (possible) technical conditions on
the magnitude of S, we have proven that interior-solution
price equilibria exist and are unique. At minimum, we have
shown that this is true for many, if not most, markets, We
have proven that the equilibria exist and are unique for
markets satisfying the technical conditions on S/R. □
Corollary B.1. Firm 1 selects r for both γlower and γhigher.
Proof. The result follows directly from Propositions 1 and 2.
Firm chooses r if γlower <γcutoff by Proposition 1 and chooses r if
γlower ≥γcutoff by Proposition 2. Thus, ﬁrm 1 chooses r inde-
pendently of γlower. We use the same arguments to show that
ﬁrm1 chooses r independently ofγhigher. (The result also requires
continuity of the proﬁt functions, proven elsewhere.) □
Corollary B.2. If ﬁrm 2 acts on γlower (believes γlower  γtrue) and
if, in the marketplace, γlower≠γtrue, then ﬁrm 2 might choose the
strategy that does not maximize proﬁts.
Proof. We provide two examples. If γlower <γcutoff <γtrue, then,
if ﬁrm 2 acts on γlower, it will choose r by Proposition 1 because
γlower <γcutoff , but the proﬁt-maximizing decision is s by
Proposition 2 because γcutoff <γtrue). If γtrue <γcutoff <γlower, then
ﬁrm 2 will choose s by Proposition 2 because γcutoff <γlower, but
the proﬁt-maximizing decision is to choose r by Proposition 1
because γtrue <γcutoff . The word “might” is important. Firm 2
might choose the correct strategy, even if γlower≠γtrue when
both γlower and γtrue are on the same side of γcutoff . □
Appendix C. List of Online Appendices
1. Numerical Example to Illustrate Stylized Model
2. Numerical Example of Craft Decisions by a Sophisti-
cated Follower
3. Practical Recommendations for CBC Craft
4. Equilibrium Prices and Brief Descriptions for the
Camera and Dormitory Studies
5. Brief Summary of the McFadden (2014) (Used in
StylizedModel), Sonnier et al. (2007), andAllenby et al. (2014)
HB CBC Normalizations
6. Speciﬁcations of the Bayesian Methods to Estimate the
Scale-Adjustment Factors
7. Comparison of Estimates for Scale Adjustment Factors
from the Three Normalizations
8. Alternative Estimations Accounting for Gender, for
Split Sample, for Split Choice Task, and for a Mixture of
Normal Distributions
9. Posterior Distributions for Scale Adjustment Factors
and Attribute Importances
10. Posterior WTP Estimates from the Three Norma-
lizations
11. Hit Rates and Uncertainty Explained (U2) for Holdout
Tests and Validation Tests
12. Empirical Posttest for Validation Task
13. Relationship of the Minimum vs. Maximum Differ-
entiation Literature to the Stylized Model
14. Comments on a Simultaneous Positioning Game
15. Additional Citations: SixMarketing Science Papers That
Discuss Scale Explicitly
Endnotes
1 Following McFadden (2014), we deﬁne scale as the magnitude of
the price coefﬁcient relative to the standard deviation of the error.
Other authors use alternative normalizations (e.g., Allenby et al.
2014, p. 427; Sonnier et al. 2007, p. 315; Train 2009, p. 40). We
address the impact of these normalizations in later sections.
2Peanut Labs is an international panel with 15 million prescreened
panelists from 36 countries. Their many corporate clients cumula-
tively gather data from approximately 450,000 completed surveys per
month. Peanut Labs is a member of the Advertising Research Foun-
dation, Council of American Survey ResearchOrganizations, European
Society for Opinion and Market Research, and Marketing Research
Association and has won many awards (see web.peanutlabs.com).
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